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  In the literature on systemic banking crises, two common themes are:  (1) Risky lending 
often follows bank liberalization.  (2)  Lack of market discipline encourages risky lending.  That 
not all liberalizations are followed by financial crisis and that financial systems without market 
discipline sometimes operate without incident invites examination of these themes.  In a test of 
six countries, we find that our measure of bank risk increases significantly in the wake of 
financial liberalizations, but only where depositors fail to discipline banks.  Our measures of 









  1  The bank crisis empirical literature remains undecided over some of the connections of 
incentives for bank risk with bank crises.  Even though a systemic shift in bank risk is the 
fulcrum over which these incentives may leverage into crisis, tests for systemic shifts towards 
risk-taking are rare in the literature.  Instead, factors that make risky lending more attractive are 
typically examined directly in their relation to crises or, separately, to each other.   
  While these approaches have enriched the literature, testing the connection of risk 
incentives to crises may obscure the elucidation of systemic risk itself.  Some financial crises, for 
example, are creatures of bad macroeconomic or fiscal outcomes whose links to risky lending in 
the traditional sense are tenuous – even though the lending turned out to be risky ex post owing 
to a force majeure.
1  Examining the connection of incentives for risk to the events triggered by 
such outcomes is instructive but may complicate our understanding of what caused the actual 
risk-taking.  We simplify the examination by directly testing for shifts in systemic bank risk and 
for their connections to factors that make risk more attractive.  With respect to who engages in 
risky lending and when it occurs, our results suggest that financial liberalization without 
depositor discipline is too powerful an intoxicant for many bankers to resist.   
  Even though we have distinguished between the economic literature on connections 
between incentives for bank risk and bank crises from the literature on links between one 
incentive and another, these two literatures speak to each other.  Martinez Peria and Schmukler 
                                                 
1 To clarify this distinction, a comparison of Mexico’s 1994-95 Tequila Crisis with Argentina’s 2001-2002 crisis is 
useful.  In the former, an acceleration of capital outflows and a subsequent exchange rate crash was preceded by 
rapid expansion in the commercial banks’ nonperforming loan ratios despite economic growth.  We offer evidence 
below to suggest that in Mexico a systemic shift towards risk was not preceded or attended by fiscal or 
macroeconomic crisis.  In retrospect, the Tequila crisis was widely perceived as a bank-risk-led crisis (viz. Gruben, 
1996 and Gruben and McComb (2003).  In the case of 2001-2002 Argentina, however, the fiscal crisis led to the 
banking crisis.  Argentina’s banking crisis was preceded by a change in government regulations to allow banks to 
use government debt to fulfill liquidity requirements, thence by government-ordered freezes on private bank 
deposits (the corralito and the corralón) and finally by the default on government debt held (under duress) by the 
banks.  For an analysis of the factors associated with this crisis in contrast with Argentina’s bank problems during 
Mexico’s Tequila crisis, see Burdisso, Saban and D’Amato (2002).  
  2(2001) conclude that deposit insurance does not diminish the extent of  depositor discipline.  
Using a very different analytical approach, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detriagache (2002) find that 
deposit insurance does affect bank crises.   Taken together these results call to question the 
linkage between depositor discipline and bank crises. 
Unresolved conflicts also characterize recent related literature on financial regulation and 
deregulation.   Barth, Caprio and Levine’s (2001) results indicate that regulatorily restricting 
bank activities increases the likelihood of financial crises.   In Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998), 
restricting bank activities in the presence of generous deposit insurance reduces financial 
fragility.  And while Barth, Caprio and Levine conclude that less restrictive bank regulations 
make financial crises less likely, an earlier literature maintains that liberalizations and related 
loan expansions often precede large increases in loan defaults or full-blown crises (de la Cuadra 
and Valdés, 1992; Gorton, 1992; deJuan, 1995; Honohan, 1999, Kaminsky and Reinhardt, 1999; 
McKinnon and Pill, 1996). 
  While debate attends the links between banking crises and subsidized deposit insurance, 
the expectation of bank bailouts and other commonly hypothesized influences on depositor 
discipline, it is clear that systemic banking crises are not continuous components of any nation’s 
financial system.  Even when their deposits enjoy explicit and subsidized insurance, most 
bankers go about their business most of the time without a crash.   
  Likewise, though much literature is concerned that financial liberalizations precede 
bubbles - which in turn precede busts - these associations are also inconstant.  Some regulatory 
transitions are orderly.     
We examine whether one reason why banking crises tend to be sporadic may involve the 
way in which the factors discussed above are linked   The infrequency of connections between 
  3market indiscipline and shifts to high risk lending suggests that – when the circuit is completed – 
some third factor might switch it on.  We examine whether the third factor may be bank 
liberalization.  The inconstant links between risky lending and bank liberalization suggest that 
they also may be conditional on a third factor.  We test to see if the factor may be depositor 
discipline. 
In our sample, the connection between bank liberalization and risky behavior completes a 
circuit where and when we would expect if the connection were indeed persistently conditional 
on the absence of market discipline.  The set of tests that allow identification of what links risky 
behavior, financial liberalization and market discipline (or indiscipline) is one contribution of 
this paper.  We begin by testing for depositor discipline in six economies – Argentina, Canada, 
Mexico, Norway, Singapore and Texas.  We then test for shifts in bank risk during periods of 
financial liberalization or privatization for the same countries.  
 
I. Depositor Discipline 
  If bankers really strategize their lending risk in accordance with their anticipations of 
depositor discipline, as is sometimes argued, we posit that they are likely to expect the discipline 
will occur (if it occurs) most strongly and painfully in periods of systemic bank stress.  We 
assume that lenders’ expectations are rational – so that the way we know what lenders 
anticipated is by seeing what in fact subsequently happened.  We accordingly test for market 
discipline in periods of bank stress that occurred in the wake of financial liberalizations that we 
also examine.
2  In the depositor (or market) discipline tests, we use bank-by-bank data to 
                                                 
2 In our tests, the period of bank stress for Argentina and Mexico is 1995, the Tequila Crisis.  For Norway, we use 
1987-1989, the nation’s banking crisis.  Although other Scandinavian countries also had crises at about this time, 
bank-by-bank data for them were unavailable to us.  For Singapore the financial stress period was 1997-1998, the 
Asian financial crisis.  For Texas we chose the period of the state’s savings and loan crisis.  No one refers to the 
  4characterize depositor responses to changes in the nonperforming loan ratio, in bank 
capitalization, and in two other properties of banks’ asset and liability portfolios.
3 
Table I presents the bank-by-bank cross-sectional results for models of the six countries.  
For each country we performed ordinary least squares regressions to gauge how inflation-
adjusted deposit growth during systemic banking stress periods responded to changes in (a) bank 
i’s past-due loans as a percentage of total assets (PDLi/TAi, to measure asset portfolio quality), 
(b) on bank i’s equity capital as a percentage of its total assets (EQi/TAi, to capture banks’ 
capacities to remain solvent in the face of financial losses), (c) on the logarithm of the quotient of 
bank i’s total assets divided by the sum of assets for all banks in the system (TAi/TA, to account 
for too-big-to-fail perceptions) and (d) on bank i’s deposits as a percentage of its total liabilities 
(DEPi/Li, as a control for the potential influence of liability composition on depositor behavior). 
In countries where depositors disciplined bankers by pulling out of asset-impaired banks, 
the ratio of past-due loans to total assets ought to explain changes in deposits during a national 
period of banking stress.  In Table 1, only Argentina and Singapore showed a significantly 
negative relationship between the percentage change in the inflation-adjusted deposit growth rate 
of banks and the past-due loans to total assets ratio.  The six equations give our measure of 
capitalization, the value of bank i’s equity capital as a percentage of its total assets (EQi/TAi), a 
smaller vote.  Only Argentina’s coefficient was positive and significant.  Norway’s was even 
negative, although not significant.
4 
                                                                                                                                                             
Canadian case of 1984-1986 as a crisis period but it includes the first bank closings since before the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.  
3 Our focus on deposit growth, asset quality and capitalization is consistent with Calomiris and Wilson (1998).  
According to their argument, as asset quality falls, capitalization must increase to maintain deposits constant.  Their 
characterization may be appropriate for industrial countries with contract enforcement and reasonably well-
organized and attentive financial regulation.  Developing countries, as will be seen, seem to offer a different story.  
For this reason we will ultimately focus our attention on asset quality and finally pay less attention to capitalization.   
4 Perhaps these results simply mean depositors’ views are consistent with theoretical and other technical literature, 
which provides conflicting predictions on whether capital requirements curtail or promote bank performance of 
  5With respect to the too-big-to-fail variable (TAi/TA), only Singapore’s coefficient was 
positive and significant.  Four of the six sample countries showed a negative (but not significant) 
sign.  Finally, while the deposit configuration variable was positive and significant in Norway, 
Argentina and Singapore, the Texas S&L coefficient was both negative and significant.   
  Regardless of cause, the number of countries with depositor discipline in their banks 
turns out to be very limited.
5  Consider a summary statistic, the significance level for the F-
statistic of each country’s respective equation.  Using the .05 level of significance as a 
benchmark, only Argentina, Singapore and Texas offered evidence of overall depositor 
discipline, and obviously asset quality was not a major contributor to the Texas model’s 
explanatory power.  More narrowly, if a significant depositor response (.05 level) to a decline in 
asset quality (see footnotes 3 and 4) is the correct measure, only Argentina and Singapore show 
depositor discipline. It is possible that the commitment technology built into Argentina’s 
Convertibility Plan and into the particular policy details associated with Singapore’s exchange 
rate targeting regime may have led depositors to believe that government bailouts would be 
unlikely when banks failed in those countries (viz.  Fernandez and Schumacher, 1998). 
 
II. Financial Liberalization and Bank Risk 
  Although we tested market discipline in our six countries during periods of bank stress, 
the periods for which we tested for shifts in bank risks instead included years around financial 
liberalizations or bank privatizations as well as years when such events did not occur. 
                                                                                                                                                             
stability.  It appears to be difficult for regulators to establish capital standards that mimic those that would be 
demanded by well-informed, undistorted private –market participants.  Indeed Rochet (1992), Besanko and Kanatas 
(1996) and Blum (1999) note that actual capital requirements may increase risk-taking behavior.    
5 At least by the strong definition of depositor discipline – depositors flee the banks.  Some analysts argue that the 
conditions for depositor discipline are satisfied when bankers with high nonperfoming loan ratios and poor 
capitalization simply have to pay higher deposit rates than other bankers.   
  6It is important to recall what might make banks take bigger risks after a financial 
liberalization.  Jumps in bank liabilities typically follow financial liberalization because it 
signifies greater opportunities to develop markets.  Suddenly, banks are permitted to pay interest 
on liabilities at rates the market will bear instead of what the government permits, or are simply 
allowed to acquire types of liabilities that had been proscribed.  A correspondingly rapid increase 
in assets follows (Gorton, 1992). 
In a narrative that resonates particularly with privatization episodes, de Juan (1995) notes 
that when new owners take control of a bank, they generally increase lending relative to the 
value of equity capital or the deposit base.  Whether or not liberalizations and related rapid loan 
expansions are followed by large increases in loan defaults – as they are in Gorton (1992), de 
Juan (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and McKinnon and Pill (1996) – a common adjunct 
to financial liberalization is markedly increased competition in the banking system (International 
Monetary Fund, 1993). 
As liabilities expand and banks seek to match them with new assets, not only the quantity 
but the quality of assets changes.   More assets typically mean larger shares of certain assets.  
After privatization, for example, Mexican banks became much more focused on consumer 
markets. 
Asset quality also often changes in the sense of the other meaning of the term quality.  
Under this same paradigm of financial liberalization, after a repressed financial system is 
liberalized banks cannot supply intermediation services efficiently because they lack expertise 
and adequate technology (Kaufman, 1998).  Banks cannot evaluate the riskiness of loans and of 
the higher real interest rates typical of a liberalized system.  Lenders lack past distributions on 
which to base their assessments.  Loan portfolios become accordingly riskier.    
  7  These depictions of post liberalization/privatization banking markets are consistent with a 
more general theoretical literature on strategic interaction among firms in growing markets 
where investment and growth of a firm are constrained by physical factors (including qualified 
personnel) or financial factors.  Firms make pre-emptive investments in a struggle for market 
share.  This struggle for a share of a new market environment can be seen as key to the sudden 
onset of high-risk bank behavior on which much of the current literature on financial and 
exchange rate crises is based. 
These same depictions of post liberalization/privatization banking markets are also 
consistent with studies of consumer behavior in which, for example, a credit card holder 
typically develops a long-standing affinity for the first credit card he or she receives (Wall Street 
Journal, 1996).  In sum, banks fighting for market share may engage in riskier strategies in 
newly open markets (for example consumer credit markets in Mexico in the early 1990s) than in 
a more mature market  - for the simple reason that the expected long-term stream of rewards is 
correspondingly greater to survivors who practiced such pre-emptive behavior.   
 
A.  The Model 
We use a model that identifies high-risk behavior in a banking system – as well as moves 
to high-risk behavior.  Even though the model serves these functions, its original purpose was to 
assess banking system competitiveness within or across markets.  We appropriated a model of 
competition to characterize bank risk because one of the model’s various states of 
competitiveness – a state that Shaffer (1993) defined as supercompetition – is mathematically 
identical to the high-risk tactic of producing where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue.   
  8  Our emphasis on breaks towards risky bank behavior connects our work with the 
literature (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, for example) in which the trajectory of a banking 
system begins with financial liberalization, leads through subsequent high risk lending, proceeds 
into serious financial stress and may conclude with a financial and exchange rate crisis.  Recall 
our allegation that such trajectories are conditional upon other factors – that sometimes a 
financial liberalization is just a financial liberalization and not an incipient financial crisis.  For 
now we focus on the portion of this sometime trajectory that joins (or does not join) 
liberalization to systemically risky bank behavior.   
  It is useful to focus on breaks towards risky behavior as necessarily transitory.  If 
we characterize the market share struggle behind these breaks as requiring marginal cost to 
exceed marginal revenue the struggle cannot persist indefinitely    What motivates the  struggle is 
that the present value of expected future return is positive despite temporary losses.
6  Finally 
because the high-risk behavior we are characterizing is a market share struggle, it may take place 
across much or all of the nation’s banking system.   
To characterize breaks into high-risk bank behavior, we present a simultaneous equation 
model that Shaffer (1993) introduced to the banking literature.  The approach allows tests of 
commercial bank system competitiveness through estimation of an index of market power (λ) 
and then applying a dummy variable to identify breaks in competitiveness or market power.  
The test revolves around the idea that profit-maximizing firms set marginal cost to what 
the literature calls their perceived marginal revenue.  If the firm’s perceived marginal revenue 
schedule and demand schedule are identical, then setting marginal cost equal to perceived 
                                                 
6 A case in point is the discussion above of consumer behavior with credit cards.  Suppose credit cards have been 
little used in a country until now and the first bank to present a consumer with a card will likely win the consumer 
for life.  Some banks entering the suddenly new credit card market may be motivated to distribute credit cards as 
  9marginal revenue is identical to setting marginal cost equal to demand price, yielding the 
classical conditions for a competitive equilibrium.  Here, firms behave simply as price takers.   
At the opposite end of the competitive spectrum – where firms act as a joint monopoly – 
a firm sets marginal cost equal to a perceived marginal revenue that corresponds to the industry’s 
marginal revenue curve (Bresnahan, 1982).  Because the firm only perceives the marginal 
revenue schedule and the demand schedule as identical under competitive equilibrium, the index 
we use to gauge the competitiveness of a commercial banking system simply expresses the 
deviation of the average bank’s perceived marginal revenue curve from the industry demand 
schedule.  If there is no deviation, we have pure competition.   
Following Bresnahan (1982)) we write a demand function for commercial bank services: 
Q = D(P, Y, α) + ε,            ( 1 )  
where Q is quantity, P is price, Y is a vector of exogenous variables, α is a vector of demand 
equation parameters to be estimated, ε is a random error term. Actual (as distinguished from 
perceived) marginal revenue is: 
MR = P + h(Q, Y, α),                                   (2) 
  = P + Q/(∂Q/∂P) 
The function h(Q, Y, α) is the semi-elasticity of demand, and h(·) ≤ 0. Firms’ perceived marginal 
revenue is: 
MR
p = P + λh(Q, Y, α),          (2’) 
where λ is a new parameter to be estimated, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Here, λ measures the degree to which 
firms recognize the distinction between demand and marginal revenue functions. Let c(Q, W, ß) 
be the average firm’s marginal cost function, where W is a vector of exogenous supply side 
                                                                                                                                                             
rapidly as possible and with less thought than it might otherwise to borrower creditworthiness because it perceives 
that haste will yield a greater present value of expected future return than prudent hesitation would.   
  10variables and ß is a vector of supply side parameters to be estimated. Maximizing firms will set 
perceived marginal revenue equal to marginal cost or, where η is a random error term, 
P = c(Q, W, ß) – λh(Q, Y, α) + η         ( 3 )  
Price taking firms perceive no difference between their marginal revenue functions and 
demand function. For them, λ = 0.  Firms acting as joint monopolies clearly perceive a difference 
between their demand and marginal revenue functions. They set output where marginal cost 
equals marginal revenue such that λ = 1. Intermediate values of λ correspond to other oligopoly 
solution concepts.  A Cournot equilibrium is suggested when λ = 1/n. 
An instructive detail of this estimating procedure is that (Shaffer, 1993) –λ is also a local 
estimate of the percentage deviation of aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium level 
of output. Since actual price deviates from the competitive price by –λQ/(∂Q/∂P), and actual 
quantity deviates from the competitive quantity by ∂Q/∂P times the deviation in price, actual 
quantity will deviate from the competitive quantity by –λQ. Thus, the percentage deviation in 
quantity is –λQ/Q = -λ.  If –λ<0, then output is less than what would occur in competitive 
equilibrium, meaning that firms are behaving as if they perceived that they had market power. 
Of particular importance for the purposes of this paper, if –λ>0, then actual output seems 
to exceed the competitive equilibrium output level, even though static allocative efficiency 
requires the marginal cost pricing outcome of λ = 0. This bank behavior outcome is referred to as 
supercompetition. It signifies that the typical bank in the market is operating at an output level 
where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. 
To estimate λ, it is necessary to estimate simultaneously specifications of both (1) and 
(3), treating P and Q as endogenous variables. The demand function is specified as: 
Q = α0 + α1P + α2Y + α 3 PZ + α 4 Z + α 5 PY +α 6YZ + ε      ( 2 ” )  
  11where Q is output quantity, P is output price, Y is a measure of macroeconomic activity, 
assumed to be an exogenous variable, and Z is the price of a substitute for bank output, also 
assumed to be exogenous. The interaction terms, the products PZ, PY and YZ, are necessary to 
permit rotation of the demand curve as required to identify λ.
7 
Following Shaffer (1993), a translog cost function is used to estimate the average 
commercial bank’s cost function as follows: 
ln C =    γ0 + γ1 ln Q + γ2 (ln Q)
2 + γ3 ln W1 + 
γ4 ln W2 + γ5 ln (W1)
2 /2 + γ6 ln (W2)
2 /2 + 
γ7 ln W1 ln W2 + γ8 ln Q lnW1 + γ9 ln Q ln W2,     (4) 
where C is total cost, W1 and W2 are exogenous input prices, as explained below. Equation (4) 
gives rise to following marginal cost function, c(Q, W, ß), 
MC = (C/Q)(ß1 + ß2 lnQ + ß3 ln W1 + ß4 ln W2) + η       (5) 
Therefore, equation (3) is specified as follows: 
P = -λQ/(α1 +α3 Z + α5Y) + (C/Q)(ß1 + ß2 ln Q + ß3 ln W1 
 +  ß4 ln W2) + ξ  .            ( 3 ’ )  
However, equation (3’) is not configured to facilitate analysis of breaks in bank behavior. To 
allow for breaks, we rely on the following specification of (3): 
P = -λQ/(α1 +α3 Z + α5 Y) + (C/Q)(ß1 + ß2 ln Q + ß3 ln W1 + ß4 ln W2) 
 -  ß5DQ/(α1 +α3 Z + α5Y) + ξ  ,          ( 3 ” )  
where D is a dummy variable to be more fully explained below and ξ is a random error term. The 
system of equations represented by (2”) and (3”) is then estimated simultaneously. 
                                                 
7 As Shaffer (1993) explains, a necessary and sufficient condition to identify λ is that the demand equation not be 
separable in at least one exogenous variable that is included in the demand function, but excluded from the marginal 
cost function. This condition is satisfied if α3 and α5 do not both equal zero. This specification of the demand 
  12  In considering the key expressions in the model, it is useful to review the contradictions 
inherent in λ versus ß5.  It is easily possible for λ, the measure of competitiveness for an entire 
examination period, to take on values of zero or greater even though ß5 takes on a negative sign.  
This combination of values would suggest that the typical bank in the country under 
consideration operated at output levels consistent with perfect competition  (λ = 0) or less than 
competitive (λ > 0) on average during the examination period overall but that during the 
subperiod characterized by a dummy variable the bank ran at supercompetitive levels (ß5 < 0).   
Applying the dummy variable for subperiods  during or just following financial liberalization in 
fact turns out to result in episodes where ß5 < 0 in several interesting cases, even though no entire 
examination periods in our model of the six countries ever yield a supercompetitive λ. 
  Research on the banking systems of the countries we consider here often disaggregates 
banks by their market scope.  Banks are sometimes characterized as large national, small 
national, multiregional, or regional.  Out of appreciation for this bank-by-bank heterogeneity of 
market scope, we emphasize that the technique applied here does not rely on any particular 
definition of bank markets.  As long as the data sample spans at least one complete market, then 
estimates of λ are unbiased.  Where the industry comprises multiple markets, λ signifies the 
average degree of market power over separate markets.  Note that λ reflects the behavior of the 
average firm in the sample. 
  Although this model assumes banks are input price takers, violating the assumption does 
not damage the results in a way that would bother many analysts.  If banks have market power 
over deposits, in violation of the assumption, it can be shown that the specification of λ 
overstates the overall degree of market power by misattributing any deposit power to the asset 
                                                                                                                                                             
function, apart from the interaction terms, represents a first-order (linearized) approximation of the true demand 
function (Shaffer 1993). Our results lead to the conclusion that α3 and α5 are not zero. Therefore λ is identified. 
  13side.
8   In this case a finding of perfect competition or supercompetition would be even more 
striking than if the input price-taking assumption were not violated.   
 
B. Some Intuitions on Competitive Breaks 
  Before considering the tests to identify breaks into supercompetition, we offer figures to 
develop an intuitive appreciation of the changing relation between bank costs and revenues 
during financial liberalizations or privatizations.  The six boxes in Figure 1 depict such changing 
relations, but the indicators that appear there are much less refined than the measures of 
competition expressed by λ (total period competition) and β5 (break, or not, during 
liberalization/privatization).  Each of the six boxes in Figure 1 depicts fluctuations in bank asset 
interest rates, bank deposit interest rates and the difference between them for one of our six 
sample countries.  The sample periods differ for each country, but each period includes a 
subperiod during and following a financial liberalization/privatization. 
A consideration of some contrasts may be in order.  Argentina’s overall period is 
December 1991 through March 1997.  During the subperiod 1995.IV-1997.I, private owners took 
control of most of most of Argentina’s publicly owned banks.  Over this subperiod, which 
followed the Tequila Crisis of 1995, the spread between asset interest rates and deposit interest 
rates rose, although not to the levels typical of the first half of the 1990s.  In any case, this 
subperiod does not show the decline in revenues relative to costs – or rise in costs relative to 
revenues – that might be consistent with a move towards substantively more competitive 
behavior.  In contrast, Canada (overall sample period, 1965-1989, with annual data) began major 
bank liberalizations in 1980 and pursued further liberalizations in subsequent years.  Around the 
                                                 
8 For a proof, see Shaffer (1994), 8-9. 
  14beginning of the liberalization subperiod, deposit rates in Figure 1 converge towards the value of 
asset rates, diverging again in 1982 and 1983. 
Note also the reduction of Mexico’s asset interest rates relative to deposit interest rates – 
as expressed through the falling difference between the two – during the privatization subperiod 
of June 1991- July 1992.  During this period all of the Mexican banks (after consolidation) that 
had been nationalized in 1982 were sold to the private sector in a series of auctions.  
Norway’s chief liberalizations included the removal of interest rate controls in the fourth 
quarter 1985, the removal of reserve requirements in 1987, and the removal of exchange controls 
in 1989.  During this period the change in spreads between asset interest rates and deposit 
interest rates was even more extreme than Mexico’s during its period of privatization.  A very 
similar pattern of movement materializes in Texas thrift institutions in the early 1980s when, 
suddenly, a system largely restricted to lending for home mortgages was permitted to configure 
its asset portfolio any way it wanted – to the point of holding no home mortgages.  During the 
early and middle-1980s many Texas thrift institutions expanded their liabilities and assets by 100 
percent per year.  
By contrast, despite steady financial liberalization during the 1990s, the relation between 
asset rates and liability rates in Singapore shows little variation at all – a pattern consistent with 
what takes place in Argentina during its 1995-1997 period of privatizations but by and large 
inconsistent with what takes place during liberalization/privatization subperiods in the other four 
countries of our sample. 
 
C. Data 
So as to maximize degrees of freedom, we used the most often-reported data available for 
the applicable period for each country. Accordingly, the number of observations per year differs 
  15among the six country models.  Recall that the periods differ as well, inasmuch as we focus on 
including subperiods that include bank liberalizations or privatizations and these events take 
place at different times in different countries.   The overall periods for each country are 
delineated in Table I under the heading “Data Period.”   The number of observations per year 
appear under the heading “Frequency.”  
 What may be seen as liberalization/privatization subperiods, outlined in the section 
above, are denoted as “Dummy Period.”  However, we identified these subperiods by testing for 
structural breaks in the overall periods that would allow us to determine where the β5 dummy 
ought to begin and end. 
It is important to note that these subperiods are not perfectly consistent with the actual 
periods of liberalization or privatization.  The Mexican privatization period, for example, began 
in June 1991 and continued through July 1992.  However, the subperiod where the break in λ 
was large enough to motivate a dummy variable to account for it ran from December 1992 
through December 1993.  This disparity should not be surprising, considering that time typically 
elapses between the purchase of a bank and when the new owners take control sufficient to run it 
differently than management had before. 
Other subperiods include 1995.IV-1997.I for Argentina, during which most bank 
privatizations took place, and a nine-year Canadian period (1981-89) following Canada’s Bank 
Act of 1980.
9  Norway’s principal liberalizations took place starting with the removal of interest 
rate controls in the second half of 1985, but the statistically defined liberalization subperiod only 
begins in the first half of 1986.  The Texas savings and loan liberalization subperiod runs from 
1984.I-1990.II while Singapore’s is 1997.I-1999.IV.  It should be noted that despite Singapore’s 
  16liberalizations of the 1990s, no subperiod offered strong evidence of a break from previous levels 
of competitive behavior. 
The procedure applied here uses the intermediation model of a bank. This approach (see 
Klein, 1971; Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Shaffer, 1993) treats the bank as using labor to acquire 
deposits and additional labor plus deposits to generate assets. The measure of output (Q) is total 
assets. The price of the output (P) is total interest income divided by total assets, i.e. average rate 
earned on assets. This average rate of return will be affected not only by market lending rates but 
by changes in the past-due loan ratio. The model requires not only output prices (P), but input 
prices for deposits (W1 = the average interest rate paid on deposits, i.e. total financial costs/total 
liabilities) and for labor (W2 total personnel expenditures/total personnel ).    
In principal, a particularly appropriate substitute for banking services would be the 
commercial paper rate in each country. Unfortunately, during the periods under study in each 
country, data on such instruments were not available for most countries. Accordingly, in the case 
of Mexico, we used the interest rate on 28-data cetes, or Mexican treasury bills. We applied rates 
on three-month Canadian government paper for Canada, three-month Norwegian treasury 
certificates for Norway and three-month Singapore Government Securities (referred to as SGS) 
for Singapore.  To make our approach to Texas as consistent as possible with other countries we 
used the U.S. three-month treasury bill.  In the Argentine case, due to a lack of a series even for 
Argentine government paper rates for the period, three-month U.S. treasury bill rates were used 
because of their close correlation with LIBOR rates. Use of this series in the Argentine model 
provided the expected signs and hoped-for levels of significance in most cases. 
As a measure of national output, an index of industrial production was used for Argentina and 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 We also tested as Argentina’s privatization period 1995.I-1997.I, so as to pick up twelve of the fifteen 
privatizations instead (as with 1995.IV-1997.I) of eleven. The results were not substantively different from 
  17Mexico since less-than-annual observations for GDP were not always available. We used GNP 
for Canada, GDP for Norway and Singapore, and gross state product for Texas.  For Argentina, 
Canada, Mexico, and Singapore all nominal variables were deflated using the consumer price 
index.  For Norway we used the GDP deflator and for Texas we used the gross state product 
deflator.   
 
D. Estimation and Results 
Table II presents estimation results for the risk-shift models of each of the six countries.  
Our a priori expectations of the parameter estimates (ai for αi, bi for ßi) were mostly confirmed 
by the results, but with exceptions, particularly the case of a2 <0  (four wrong signs Argentina, 
Mexico, Norway and Texas out of six cases) and of a4 > 0 in the cases of Mexico, Norway and 
Singapore (although Singapore was not statistically significantly different from zero.). Since the 
demand curve is assumed to be downward sloping, the estimate of ∂Q/∂P = a1 + a3Z < 0 must 
hold, as it did in all cases. As earlier noted, either a3 or a5 must be different from zero in order to 
identify λ, a condition that was always satisfied in some form, although Canada , Norway and 
Singapore were not statistically different from zero in their a3  values and Singapore was not with 
respect to a5 . Our estimate of the parameter vector ß met with a priori expectations in the sense 
that unexpected signs never were significant, although we held no a priori expectation on b5. 
The systems of equations were estimated by the method of Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood. This method assumes normally distributed errors. Initial parameter values for the 
FIML estimation were supplied by first estimating the system by non-linear Three-Stage Least 
Squares. The interaction variable YZ had to be omitted in the estimation because it was nearly 
perfectly linearly correlated with the variable Z for Argentina, Mexico, Norway , Singapore, 
                                                                                                                                                             
characterizing the regime shift period as 1995.IV-1997.I. 
  18Texas  This was due to the small variation in industrial production that occurred over the period 
of the sample. Therefore, in the reported results, there are no estimates for a6 for those two 
countries although there are estimates for Canada, where GNP was used for Y. 
Problems with multicollinearity remain in this sample. In particular, ln W1 is highly 
correlated with Z, causing difficulty in estimating and making inferences on the parameter vector 
ß. Nevertheless, convergence of the estimates was fairly rapid in all cases. The estimates also 
appear to be robust relative to initial values of the parameter estimates. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important results involve the coefficients of 
λ, the variable that measures level of competitiveness, and of b5, the λ-related dummy variable 
coefficient for the liberalization or privatization period for each of the six countries. Recall that 
the value of -λ represents a typical bank's percentage deviation of output from competitive levels. 
A -λ<0 signifies output below the competitive level while -λ>0 suggests that output for some 
reason exceeds the competitive level. 
With the exception of Texas, none of the banking systems’ λ values were significantly 
different from zero.  Texas registered a –λ < 0 (i.e. λ  > 0) and significant,   evidence of less than 
competitive output, signaling uncompetitive or collusive behavior for the overall measurement 
period.  As will be discussed below, however, Texas’ turns out to have a negative and significant 
b5 coefficient for its liberalization subperiod.    
That the null hypothesis that λ = 0 could not be rejected at a reasonable level of 
significance for the other five economies signifies that the average bank in each of them behaves 
consistently with the competitive paradigm. That is, in none of the five remaining cases did the 
average bank operate where marginal cost exceeded marginal revenue for its total observation 
period.  We tested the robustness of the results for other specifications, especially for log first 
  19differences. The results are qualitatively unchanged if iterations converge. 
The question remains, however, as to whether any of the six economies posted  high-risk, 
supercompetitive levels during their post-liberalization or privatization periods.  Recall that in 
examining the results for the post-liberalization or privatization period, the sign and value of b5, 
the dummy variable coefficient, deserve particular attention. For such periods, instead of 
equaling λ, the index of market power approximates λ + b5 and b5 is the difference of levels of 
competitiveness between two periods. If b5 is negative and significant, the period for which the 
dummy applies demonstrates a significant increase in the riskiness of bank behavior.  Where λ is 
not significantly different from zero, a negative and significant b5 suggests that supercompetition 
characterized the liberalization/privatization subperiod  
In sum, b5 signals whether or not a break into supercompetitiveness took place during the 
liberalization/privatization subperiod.  The signs of the b5 coefficients in Table II show that in 
these sub-periods, the average bank in low depositor discipline countries as defined by the 
coefficient on the past-due-loan-to-assets ratio in the six equations in Table I (Canada, Mexico, 
Norway, Texas) may have pursued riskier behavior than outside these periods.   However, only 
the Canada, Mexico and Texas risk shifts were significantly different from zero. 
 
III. A Connection Between Depositor Discipline and Breaks to Riskiness 
  Figure 2 graphically links depositor discipline with breaks to riskiness for the six 
economies tested.   To characterize the degree of depositor discipline, the horizontal axis 
presents the t-statistic of the coefficient of the past-due-loans-to-total-assets ratio for the six 
economies for which an equation appears in Table I, multiplied by minus unity.  Because the 
values are multiplied by minus one, the most significantly negative relation between the past due 
  20loan ratio and deposit growth would be the farthest to the right on the figure, while the least 
negative and significant relation between these variables would be the farthest to the left on the 
figure.  This configuration means that Argentina has the greatest degree of depositor discipline, 
followed by Singapore.  Mexico has the least depositor discipline, followed by Canada.     
To characterize the structural break in the direction of supercompetitiveness, the vertical 
axis presents the value of the b5 coefficient that appears in Table II.  Recall that the more 
negative an economy’s b5 is, the stronger its break to supercompetitiveness is.  Conversely, the 
more positive an economy’s b5, the less of a break towards supercompetition.   By this measure, 
with a value between –0.3 and –0.4, Mexico makes the largest break towards 
supercompetitiveness during its privatization period while, with values of zero, Singapore and 
Argentina do not make breaks toward supercompetitiveness at all.  Recall that neither the λ 
values of Mexico, Singapore nor Argentina are significantly different from zero, signaling that 
Mexico did enter a supercompetitiveness episode while neither Singapore nor Argentina did.   
  The most important aspect of Figure 2 is the overall conclusion it allows – that by these 
measures the less depositor discipline a country has (i.e. the farthest to the left the country is on 
the figure) the more profound (i.e. farther below zero) is its liberalization/privatization period 
break towards supercompetition.  
  Figure 3 reaffirms this relationship with t-statistics on both the x and y axis.  As before, 
the x-axis delineates t-values (again multiplied by minus unity) for the coefficients of the 
depositor discipline variable PDL/TA for each of the six countries.  In contrast to Figure 2, 
Figure 3’s y-axis presents t-statistics for the b5 coefficient of each country.  Here, the more 
negative the t-value of the b5 the more significant the break towards supercompetition.  By this 
  21pair of measures as well, banking systems with less depositor discipline are clearly more prone 
towards breaks into supercompetition, where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
  We have tested the links between depositor discipline and the predisposition of banks to 
break towards risky behavior in periods associated with bank liberalization or privatization.  The 
distinctions between what we test and what others test is important.  We focus on depositor 
discipline rather than the presence or not of deposit insurance because it is conceivably possible 
to have depositor discipline with or without deposit insurance or other bank or depositor rescue 
programs.  Moreover, the presence of de facto depositor insurance is hard to identify.  Some 
countries (Korea in the 1990s, for example) did not in fact have deposit insurance de juris but 
turned out to have it de facto or ex post facto.  Our concern was not whether bankers had deposit 
insurance but whether depositors were willing to punish them when their asset quality went bad.   
  More important, and more unusually, we tested to see if or when banks took risky 
positions under some circumstances during liberalization or privatizations.  From a policy 
perspective, we considered this behavior by banks more important than whether or not they fell 
into crises.  Crises, after all, could be caused by a host of factors – some of which had nothing to 
do with banks’ predispositions toward risk-taking. Therefore our examination – focusing on 
depositor discipline rather than ex ante insurance, and on bank risk rather than bank crisis - is 
much narrower in many senses than what is typical in similar work. 
Our question was:  Were banks without much depositor discipline more likely to take 
risks than banks with depositor discipline.  Certainly by the standards of Figure 2, the answer is 
  22that they do.  This finding is important because risk is something banks can take on their own, 
regardless of what is going on in the economy.   
 
  
      
  
  




     
 
 
  23References 
 
Barth, James R., Gerald Caprio and Ross Levine, 2001, “Bank Regulation and Supervision:  
What Works Best?” World Bank Working Paper No. 2725. 
 
Besanko, David and George Kanatas, 1996, “The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital 
Standards Promote Bank Safety?”  Journal of Financial Intermediation 5,160-83 
 
Blum, Jurg,  (1999), “Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?”  Journal 
of Banking & Finance 23, 755-771. 
 
Boyd, J.H. C Chang, and B.D. Smith, 1998, “Moral Hazard Under Commercial and Universal 
Banking,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30, 426-468. 
 
Bresnahan, Timothy, 1982, “The Oligopoly Solution is Identified.”  Economics Letters 10, 87-
 92. 
 
Burdisso, Tamara, Verónica Cohen Saban and Laura D’Amato, 2002, “The Argentine Banking 
and Exchange Rate Crisis of 2001:  Can We Learn Something New About Financial 
Crisis?” Paper Presented at the XVII Jornadas Anuales de Economia of the Banco 
Central de Uruguay. 
 
Calomiris, Charles W. and Wilson, Berry, 1998, “Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 
1930's "Capital Crunch" and Scramble to Shed Risk”, July, pp. 33, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper: 6649 
 
de la Cuadra, Sergio and Salvador Valdés, 1992, "Myths and Facts About Financial  
  Liberalization in Chile: 1974-1983," in Philip E. Brock (ed.) If Texas Were Chile (San 
  Francisco:  Institute for Contemporary Studies Press). 
 
de Juan, Aristóbulo, 1995, "The Roots of Banking Crises:  Micro-Economic Issues and Issues of  
Supervision and Regulation," Paper prepared for the Conference on Banking Crises in 
Latin America, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.  (October 6). 
 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli and Enrica Detragiache, 2002, “Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking 
System Stability?  An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 
1373-1406.  
 
Fernandez, Roque B. And Liliana Schumacher, 1998, “The Argentine Banking Panic After the 
  ‘Tequila’ Shock: Did ‘Convertibility’ Help or Hurt?” in Scheherezade S. Rehman (ed.) 
  Financial Crisis Management and Regional Blocks, (Boston: Kluwer). 
 
Gorton, Gary, 1992, "Comment," in Phillip E. Brock (ed.) If Texas Were Chile (San Francisco:  
  Institute for Contemporary Studies Press). 
 
  24Gruben, William C., 1996, “Policy Priorities and the Mexican Exchange Rate Crisis,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas  Economic Review.  First Quarter.   
 
Gruben, William C. and Robert P. McComb, 2003, “Privatization, competition and 
supercompetition in the Mexican commercial banking system,” Jounral of Banking and 
Finance 27, 229-249.  
 
Honohan, Patrick, 1999, “Financial Liberalization:  How Far?  How Fast?” Draft Concept Paper 
for Research Project.  World Bank.   
 
International Monetary Fund, 1993, International Capital Markets, Part II: Systematic Issues in 
 International  Finance. 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1999, “The Twin Crises:  The Causes of 
  Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,” American Economic Review 89, 473-500. 
 
Kaufman, George G., 1998, “Structuring Prudential Bank Regulation to Promote Efficiency and 
  Safety,” paper presented at a conference on “Regulation in Post-Privatization  
  Environments: The Latin American Experience,” Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 21-22, 
 1998.   
 
Klein, Michael, 1971,  “A Theory of the Banking Firm.”  Journal of Money, Credit, and 
 Banking 7, 205-18. 
 
Lau, Lawrence J., 1982,  “On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and  
Output Data.” Economics Letters 10, 93-99. 
 
Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad and Sergio L. Schmukler, 2002, “Do Depositors Punish Banks for 
Bad Behaviour?  Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises,” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. LVI, No. 2, 1029-1051. 
 
McKinnon, Ronald I. and Huw Pill, 1996, "Credible Liberalizations and International Capital 
  Flows:  "The Overborrowing Syndrome," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger (eds). 
  Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia (Chicago:  The University of 
 Chicago  Press). 
 
Rochet, Jean-Charles, (1992), “Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks,” 
European Economic Review 36, 1137-1178. 
 
Rojas-Suárez, Liliana and Steven R. Weisbrod, 1996, “Towards an Effective Regulatory and 
  Supervisory Framework for Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank  
  Discussion Paper No. 336. 
 
Sealey, Calvin W., and James T. Lindley, 1977,  “Inputs, Outputs, and a Theory of Production 
  and Cost at Depository Financial Institutions.” Journal of Finance 32, 1251-66. 
 
  25Shaffer, Sherrill,  1993,  “A Test of Competition in Canadian Banking.” Journal of Money, 
 Credit,  and  Banking 25, 49-61. 
 
Shaffer, Sherrill, 1994, “Market Conduct and Aggregate Excess Capacity in Banking:  A Cross-
  Country Comparison,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 93-
 28R. 
 






     
  26TABLE I 
Deposit Growth and Asset Quality 
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Note: the dependent variable is the percentage change in the inflation-adjusted deposit growth 
rate of bank i. PDLi/TAi is bank i’s past-due loan as a percentage of total assets.    EQi/TAi is bank 
i’s equity capital as a percentage of total assets. TAi/TA is the bank i’s total assets over the sum 
of total assets of the banks examined. DEPi/LI is bank i’s deposit as a percentage of total liability. 
t-statistics in parentheses, based on approximate standard errors (***: significant at 0.01 level, 
**: significant at 0.05 level, *: significant at 0.1 level) 
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Estimation of Equation (2’’) and (3’) 
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22 25  81 
Data Period  91:q4 - 97:q1  65 – 89  87:Apr - 93:Dec 
Dummy Period  95:q1 - 97:q1    81 – 89  92:Dec - 93:Dec 
Frequency Quarterly  Annual  Monthly 
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  Norway Singapore 
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*** 
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27 42 60 
Data Period  80:II - 93:II  91:q1 - 01:q3  84:q1 - 98:q4 
Dummy Period  86:I - 90:II    97:q1 - 99:q4  84:q1 - 90:q2 
Frequency Semi-Annual  Quarterly  Quarterly 
 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, based on approximate standard errors (***: significant at 0.01 
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Footnote: 
We tried to test the robustness of the results for other specifications, especially for log first 
differences. The results are qualitatively unchanged if iterations converge. 
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Note: The proxy of depositor's discipline is the t-statisitcs of the coefficients of PDL/TA in table 1 and the change of 

















00 . 511 . 522 . 533 . 544 . 5





Note: The proxy of depositor's discipline is the t-statisitcs of the coefficients of PDL/TA in table 1 and the change of 
competitiveness of the banks is measured by the t-statistics of the coefficient B5 in table 2.
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